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 Philosophy “rock star” Slavoj Zizek takes exception to those who smugly 
proclaim that Western culture has entered a post-ideological age. In such an age, 
people no longer hold to deep beliefs about religion or history or politics. They 
do not need Hegel or Jesus Christ, Moses or Marx. They have become more 
pragmatic creatures who make rational choices based on their self-interest—
whether that be economic or psychological, political or sexual. They are freed 
from ultimately foundationless doctrines such as Christianity or Marxism. 
Zizek tells the story of a man whose wife died of cancer rather suddenly. 
The man dealt remarkably well with her passing. But his friends noticed that 
whenever he talked about his wife he held a hamster in his hands—his wife’s 
beloved pet. Months later the hamster died, the man had an emotional 
breakdown, and he had to be hospitalized for severe depression. In this 
philosophical parable, the death of the wife is the death of ideologies and the 
hamster is the fetish that allows people to persevere in the absence of ideologies. 
So to the post-ideologist, Zizek asks “where is your hamster—the fetish which enables 
you to (pretend to) accept reality ‘the way it is’?” (Zizek, “Afterword,” 252). 
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 I want to argue that it is in popular culture that we find an array of 
fetishistic objects that people desire in a post-ideological Western culture. From 
television shows to Barbies, from movies to sports teams, people find a fetish that 
serves to fill the void left by the absence of religious and political ideology. 
Despite the therapeutic benefits, however, my claim is that, in a viciously circular 
manner, popular culture fetishes depend upon and promote a kind of self that is 
feeble and diminished—a kind of self that we would be wise to avoid. 
 In order to understand how fetishes work, it is instructive to look at not 
only Zizek’s account, but Karl Marx’s as well. Marx describes a commodity as 
“an object outside us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some 
sort or another” (Marx, 437). Commodities have a mystical or mysterious 
character to them. Produced by human beings, they take on a life of their own—
detached from the hands that make them. They become the locus of social 
relations, to the extent that the consumers and the producers are only in a 
relationship through the commodity itself. Marx compares commodities to the 
gods of the religious world. 
In that [religious] world the productions of the 
human brain appear as independent beings endowed 
with life, and entering into relation both with one 
another and the human race. So it is in the world of 
commodities with the products of men’s hands. This I 
call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products 
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of labour, so soon as they are produced as 
commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from 
the production of commodities. (Marx, 447) 
Thus, the attachment to or even craving of commodities is fetishism. The 
commodities that we desire fulfill our needs “of some sort or another.” While 
some of these needs may be biological, commodity fetishism speaks more to 
deeper psychological or existential needs such as human relations and meaning. 
It speaks in particular to those needs that arise in response to traumatic change, 
such as, today, the fall of ideological structures. These needs are even more 
powerful than those of biology, and they explain the powerful draw that 
commodities have on us. This is the focus of the work of someone like Zizek, 
drawing on the psychoanalytic work of Jacques Lacan as well as Marxist theory. 
Zizek makes a distinction between a symptom and a fetish. Take again the 
case of the death of a loved one:  
in the case of a symptom, I “repress” this death, I try 
not to think about it, but the repressed trauma returns 
in the symptom; in the case of a fetish, on the 
contrary, I “rationally” fully accept this death, and yet 
I cling to the fetish, to some feature that embodies for 
me the disavowal of this death. In this sense, a fetish 
can play a very constructive role in allowing us to 
cope with the harsh reality: fetishists are not dreamers 
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lost in their private worlds, they are thoroughly 
“realists,” able to accept the way things effectively 
are—since they have their fetish to which they can 
cling in order to cancel the full impact of reality. 
(Zizek, On Belief, 13-14) 
 The man whose wife died could repress his sadness and try not to think 
about her. He could throw himself, for example, into his work—perhaps even in 
an obsessive manner. Here his repressed mourning shows itself in his symptom, 
in his obsessive dedication to his job. On the other hand, he might rationally 
accept the death and talk about it freely—but only with the aid of the fetish. In 
this case, the hamster helps him to cope with the burden of the reality that he 
does not repress but that he also cannot accept at face value. As Zizek concludes, 
“a fetish is the embodiment of the lie which enables us to sustain the unbearable 
truth. . . . In this sense, a fetish can play a very constructive role of allowing us to 
cope with harsh reality” (Zizek, Universal, 253). 
 Zizek’s work abounds with examples of fetishes in Western culture. 
Money is a good one. He writes that “a bourgeois subject knows very well that 
there is nothing magic about money, that money is just an object which stands 
for a set of social relations, but he nevertheless acts in real life as if he believed 
that money is a magical thing” (Zizek, Universal, 254-255). Western Buddhism is 
often a target for Zizek. While practitioners go about their daily business 
immersed in capitalist endeavors, they can act as if they are detached from it 
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(Zizek, Universal, 254). Thus, they can believe themselves to be free of that 
system’s manipulations and injustices while knowing they are not.1 
The commodities of popular culture are fetishistic as well. While we know 
that they are mostly trash and meaningless, we act as if they are important and 
increasingly structure our lives around them—be it the ritualistic viewing of our 
favorite weekly television show or the obsessive fascination with our celebrities 
or our potentially unhealthy identification with our chosen sports team. 
 On the issue of commodity fetishism, Zizek’s work is consistent with that 
of thinkers who came out of the Frankfurt School, itself shaped by the Marxist 
tradition. Along with his frequent collaborator Max Horkheimer, Theodor 
Adorno critiqued the “culture industry” or “mass culture.” He writes, “Before 
the theological caprices of commodities, the consumers become temple slaves. 
Those who sacrifice themselves nowhere else can do so here, and here they are 
fully betrayed” (Adorno, 39). They are betrayed because the commodities never 
satisfy their needs, at least not enough or for long enough. Adorno, in his 
typically bleak manner, concludes: “Without admitting it they [the consumers of 
commodities] sense that their lives would be completely intolerable as soon as 
they no longer clung to satisfactions which are none at all” (Adorno, 103). For 
Zizek, the satisfactions are “none at all” because, like Coca-Cola, they never 
                                                                   
1 Or take democracy.  As with any symbolic order (the “Big Other” for Zizek), democracy entails 
the violent imposition of itself on the population and thus always fails to meet its ideal. Thus, 
Zizek concludes that “I know very well (that the democratic form is just a form spoiled by stains of 
‘pathological’ imbalance), but just the same (I act as if democracy were possible)” (Zizek, Looking 
Awry, 168). 
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really satisfy us. He argues that Coke’s “strange taste does not seem to provide 
any particular satisfaction; it is not directly pleasing and endearing; however, it 
is precisely as such, as transcending any immediate use-value (unlike water, beer 
or wine, which definitely do quench our thirst or produce the desired effect of 
satisfied calm), that Coke functions as the direct embodiment of ‘it’: of the pure 
surplus of enjoyment over standard satisfactions, of the mysterious and elusive X 
we are all after in our compulsive consumption of merchandise” (Zizek, Fragile, 
22). Whether or not we agree with this negative assessment of Coke, Zizek’s 
point is clear: consumption never ultimately satisfies us. As he concludes, “every 
satisfaction opens up a gap of ‘I want more!’” (Zizek, Fragile, 22). But the problem 
is not simply that we can never consume enough, it is that there is a fundamental 
lack in all consumption. It is not that I cannot drink enough Cokes. Whether I 
drink 10 or 10,000, my consumption of each one is an experience of lack—of the 
failure of the commodity to satisfy my real need.2 
 So what can we take from Marx and Zizek? First, from Marx we must 
recognize that fetishes (in this case in regard to commodities) represent or 
embody social relations, but in an alienated way. We are not directly in 
relationships with others, for these relationships only are mediated through 
commodities. And from Zizek we see that fetishes help us to cope with a reality 
that we do not repress, but with which we only can cope by virtue of the fetish. 
                                                                   
2 This “real need” is a consequence of what Zizek, borrowing from Lacan, calls the “Real.” This 
“Real” is the untouchable and unknowable void—like a black hole in space—around which our 
psychic life revolves. Like a black hole, we cannot “see” the Real, but only witness its effects. 
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So if fetishes are a sign of alienation from others, from social relations; and they 
are a sign of alienation from reality, because we fundamentally cannot cope with 
reality directly but only through fetishistic mediation; and if popular culture can 
be seen as an array of fetishistic objects and phenomena; then popular culture in 
the end is dependent on a socially-isolated and psychologically-impaired self for 
its success and in its standard mode of operation popular culture promotes such a 
self. Stated another and shorter way, popular culture depends upon and 
promotes the postmodern self. 
This is the kind of self Alasdair MacIntyre describes and criticizes. 
Throughout much of his career, but particularly in his work After Virtue, first 
published in 1981, MacIntyre makes a compelling argument that moral life is not 
a matter of rational assent to a set of transcendental philosophical or logical rules 
of conduct. Instead, moral life is grounded in communities that have a certain 
history and that are bound to a certain tradition or traditions that provide the 
justification for the moral life lived in those communities. This does not mean 
that there is no place for ethical reflection, but that community, history, and 
tradition precede that reflection and only on the foundation of that community, 
history, and tradition will the judgments and the actions from that reflection be 
justified. The broader criticism here is of the stereotypical, liberal rational being 
or postmodern self. The broader criticism is of the self defined by its rational 
capabilities rather than by the intricate web of relationships that form a 
substantive understanding of the self—a web that includes other selves in the 
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community, the history of that community, and the tradition that provides 
myths, legends, rituals and so much more that explain what it means to be in this 
intricate web. The broader criticism is of what I will call the “naked self.” 
MacIntyre’s project is both descriptive and prescriptive. He is describing 
the nature of the self. He also is describing what he takes to be changes in our 
understanding of the self, changes that can be traced philosophically back to 
Kant’s transcendental arguments of the 18th century but that have had a broader 
and more pervasive impact among 20th century liberal democracies in the West—
democracies that fundamentally presuppose the naked self. But MacIntyre is also 
prescribing a remedy to what he takes to be a contemporary social disease, and 
his remedy is to reinvigorate our traditions (his tradition of choice is Catholicism, 
though other traditions might be equally worthwhile) as sites where people can 
once again be whole selves (or, one might say, “clothed selves”).3 
Of course, there are some advantages to the naked self—especially in a 
pluralistic society. If we are all clothed selves, divided into separate 
communities, histories, and traditions, how can we form one society or one 
nation? Won’t these divisions simply lead to conflict? Haven’t they done so 
throughout human history? Do we really want a bunch of conflicting moral 
                                                                   
3 Hermeneutically speaking, there are no purely naked selves. We always already are caught up 
in community, history, and tradition. Here MacIntyre is consistent with a significant strand of 
20th century philosophy. In particular I am thinking of the kind of self described by Martin 
Heidegger’s notion of our “thrownness” or Hans-Georg Gadamer’s idea of the “effective history” 
and the key role of “tradition” or even Paul Ricoeur’s analysis of the “narrative self.” Like 
MacIntyre, such philosophers reject the naked self of postmodern liberal democracies—the kind 
of self we are left with in a post-ideological age. 
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codes instead of one morality to which we can all rationally assent? MacIntyre is 
aware of these problems. But, for MacIntyre, the costs of the naked self (moral 
ambiguity, anxiety concerning life’s purposes, loss of meaning, etc.) far outweigh 
the advantages. 
MacIntyre’s analysis can be applied to the self of popular culture. Popular 
culture treats the self not as grounded in a rich tradition that provides meaning 
and purpose, but as groundless—capable of being swayed and manipulated to 
consume this product or that form of entertainment. The popular culture self is 
conceived as one that has certain desires or cravings that are not bound to a 
community, history, or tradition.4 We come into the world as naked (literally and 
figuratively) individual consumers and we die that way.5  
                                                                   
4 As a colleague has pointed out to me, a particularly devilish problem for MacIntyre is that our 
traditions already have been mediated or re-figured through popular culture. In this sense, not 
only are we “always already” within community, history, and tradition, we “always already” are 
within those through popular culture. Direct access to them is impossible. 
5 The consumer self that is stripped of connections with community, tradition, and history is 
infinitely pliable and manipulated by producers of commodities and culture. And as citizens 
come to see themselves primarily as consumers (even if only unconsciously), they increasing put 
their freedom at risk in light of the manipulation of the popular culture industry. Even worse, 
citizens increasingly recognize the ways in which they are manipulated yet willingly cede their 
freedom in this regard. Adorno argues that the “dream industry [culture industry] does not so 
much fabricate the dreams of the customers as introduce the dreams of the suppliers among the 
people” (Adorno, 93). This is a powerful critique, but its effect is minimal because nobody seems 
to care that their dreams (read “wants” or “desires”) are not their own but are the dreams of 
commodity producers. As Adorno affirms, “The customer is not king, as the culture industry 
would have us believe, not its subject but its object” (Adorno, 99). It is in this sense that Adorno 
argues that the culture industry is not a consequence of human desires, it does not conform itself 
to the wants of the consumer, rather it conforms the consumer to itself. Adorno concludes that 
“the culture industry is not the art of the consumer but rather the projection of the will of those in 
control onto their victims” (185). Jean Baudrillard puts forth a similar claim. “It has never been so 
clear that the content—here, culture, elsewhere, information or commodities—is nothing but the 
phantom support for the operation of the medium itself,” he argues, “whose function is always to 
induce mass, to produce a homogeneous human and mental flux” (Baudrillard, 67). The 
consequences for the individual are grave. Popular culture creates a world of simulacra and 
simulations that prevents us from experiencing any real meaning in events or relationships. Thus, 
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The naked selves of American culture are easy pickings for businesses and 
corporations that provide consumer services and goods. The strategy of “market 
segmentation” both draws upon individual preference and further isolates 
individuals from what we might call their “natural” communities—those based 
on neighborhood geography, school districts, etc. On the one hand, companies 
utilizing market segmentation draw upon similarities within a particular group 
and offer products to its specific needs or wants. On the other hand, however, 
such a strategy accentuates dividing lines among the population, whether along 
the lines of race, age, class, ethnicity, or more. It also cuts across “natural” 
communities, appealing to consumers from one end of the country to the other. 
As Lizabeth Cohen concludes in her book A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of 
Mass Consumption in Postwar America, market segmentation strengthened “the 
boundaries between social groups, it contributed to a more fragmented America” 
(Cohen, 331). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
“events no longer have meaning: it is not that they are insignificant in themselves, it is that they 
are preceded by the model, with which their processes only coincided” (Baudrillard, 56). 
Baudrillard also warns of a critical inversion in which we become the objects of the commodities 
rather than the commodities being our objects. He writes: 
people go there [the mall or “hypermarket”] to find and to select 
objects-responses to all the questions they may ask themselves; 
or, rather, they themselves come in response to the functional and 
directed question that the objects constitute. The objects are no 
longer commodities: they are no longer even signs whose 
meaning and message one could decipher and appropriate for 
oneself, they are tests, they are the ones that interrogate us, and 
we are summoned to answer them, and the answer is included 
in the question. Thus all the messages in the media function in a 
similar fashion: neither information nor communication, but 
referendum, perpectual test, circular response, verification of the 
code. (Baudrillard, 75) 
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One might imagine that market segmentation at least leads to distinct 
consumer communities. And we might conclude that some community is better 
than none. Certainly there are those in the Harley-Davidson community or the 
Star Trek (Trekkers) community, but these are more exceptions than the rule. 
Such communities entail a kind of lifestyle that accompanies the consumer 
product in a way that most consumer products do not (though certainly 
advertisers, whether for the Gap or Coca-Cola, try to convince us that their 
products are lifestyle choices). And I would go further. By appealing to 
individual needs or wants and emphasizing consumer choice, market 
segmentation contributes to the prevalence of naked selves. You join your 
consumer community and remain with it as long as it brings you enjoyment and 
makes you feel good. When it no longer does that, you move on to another 
consumer product and join a new community. This mentality translates poorly to 
our natural communities of neighborhoods, school districts, and towns—places 
where we need to be able to work with one another to resolve conflicts and 
figure out solutions to local problems, where conflicts and problems can appear 
intractable and our continued efforts depend on our acting as citizens and not 
consumers. No wonder we increasingly find ourselves shut up in our homes 
with curtains drawn, our windows to the world and each other restricted to 
computer monitors and television screens. For his part, Zizek describes us as 
monads. He asks, “Are we not more and more monads with no direct windows 
onto reality, interacting alone with the PC screen, encountering only the virtual 
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simulacra, and yet immersed more than ever in the global network, 
synchronously communicating with the entire globe?” (Zizek, On Belief, 26).6 
Many scholars argue that popular culture is a creator of community rather 
than a hindrance to it. Take the example of Trekkers, as pop culture guru Henry 
Jenkins has done. Is this a genuine community, like those we might associate 
with towns, churches, or civic organizations? Businesses and corporations, 
through market segmentation, bring very different people together into 
communities revolving around consumer products. But these communities have 
identity only to the degree that individuals purchase and enjoy those products. 
Any individual can move in or out of that community based on personal 
preference and financial resources. Such communities do not tackle local 
problems or generate long-lasting commitments to the community. Remember, 
commodities are only mediators of social relationships. The commodities of 
popular culture ultimately obfuscate these relationships. Thus, the genuine 
community that can arise from social relationships is missing in popular culture. 
Defining community or distinguishing between kinds of communities, however, 
is difficult. I think this is reflected in one of Jenkins’ most influential essays, “Star 
Trek Rerun, Reread, Rewritten: Fan Writing as Textual Poaching.” In the essay he 
slips from using scare quotes around the word community to not using scare 
                                                                   
6 Or, as Guy Debord concludes, “Spectators [or we can say, consumers] are linked solely by their 
one-way relationship to the very centre that keeps them isolated from each other. The spectacle 
thus reunites the separated, but it reunites them only in their separateness” (Debord, 16). 
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quotes. I think this suggests his own ambivalence about these consumer 
communities and the naked selves of which they are constituted.7 
As I have suggested the proliferation of naked selves described in this 
paper, the popular culture selves, poses some negative consequences for social 
and political life. The consumer of popular culture is an isolated individual. 
There is nothing that binds the consumer with his or her fellow citizens other 
than the act of consumption. There are no common traditions or codes of 
conduct. Of course, many consumers share a particular product of popular 
culture in common. Harley Davidson motorcycle owners form a community of 
sorts, as do (we might suppose) Starbucks coffee drinkers or fans of the television 
series Lost. But even here we fail to reach any level of political critical mass. We 
do not have political community. (Again, I suspect there are exceptions that 
prove the rule.) We have groupings as a consequence of market segmentation. 
And as Cohen notes, the market segmentation of consumer culture has long since 
made its way into the political arena. In other words, not only are consumers 
                                                                   
7 I would argue that we need to distinguish at least three types of consumer-based 
communities associated with popular culture. Product-centered communities revolve around 
specific consumer commodities, such as people who wear clothing from the Gap or choose Mac 
versus PC. Lifestyle-centered communities involve a commodity, but include particular 
behaviors and attitudes that shape a person's life. For example, those people who own a Harley-
Davidson are not just owning a motorcycle but choosing a particular lifestyle. Finally, there are 
religio-locale-centered-communities. An example of this type of community is a college football 
community, and I am thinking particularly of those in the American South. Such communities, 
while certainly within popular culture and sharing some characteristics with the other types, are 
different from product-centered or lifestyle-centered communities. In particular they are different 
because they have a sense of place (a locale) and function in religious or pseudo-religious ways. 
As a consequence, they achieve a greater sense of community and thus become distinct from 
other consumer-based communities (though threatened by the same factors that function 
perniciously in those other types). 
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divided through market segmentation, but citizens are divided as well—into 
liberals and conservatives, the religious and non-religious, gay rights advocates 
and their opponents, and, of course, Pro-Choices and Pro-Lifers. In such a public 
square, politicians rarely focus on the common good. They focus on the goods of 
constituencies instead.8 Cohen concludes that “just as segmented buyers of goods 
seek the best match for their distinctive tastes and desires with what is available 
in the commercial marketplace, so segmented citizens have similarly come to 
expect the political marketplace—consisting of candidates, government agencies, 
and PACs—to respond to their needs and interests narrowly construed” (Cohen, 
343). In short, citizens—full citizens, clothed in the familiarity of community, 
history, and tradition—have been turned into naked consumers. 
 The ways that popular culture exploits and encourages naked selves is 
pretty depressing.9 This sense of foreboding gets worse when we begin to 
consider the social and political consequences. One might wonder if there is any 
hope for our future. Adorno perhaps foresaw this predicament when he wrote: 
                                                                   
8 Cohen observes that rather than “try to convince voters of some common good, as Roosevelt, 
Truman, and Eisenhower all struggled to do—from FDR’s Four Freedoms to Ike’s prime-time 
‘Eisenhower Answers America’—more recent presidential candidates, as well as many running 
for lower office, at best construct a composite vision out of the specialized interests of their 
distinct constituencies, and at worst avoid discussing any common good at all” (Cohen, 342). 
9 Admittedly, one’s community, history, and tradition can be limiting if not downright 
oppressive—especially if you are, for example, homosexual or bisexual. In this sense, 
“clothedness” can be a psychologically harmful experience and it would be much better to be 
naked. But I do not think this needs to be a stark either/or choice—either the comfortable (for the 
majority) “clothedness” of community, history, and tradition that leads to the marginalization or 
even persecution of minorities or the liberating “nakedness” represented in (among other places) 
popular culture. 
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The neon signs which hang over our cities and 
outshine the natural light of the night with their own 
are comets presaging the natural disaster of society, 
its frozen death. Yet they do not come from the sky. 
They are controlled from earth. It depends upon 
human beings themselves whether they will 
extinguish these lights and awake from a nightmare 
which only threatens to become actual as long as men 
believe in it. (Adorno, 96)10 
If this “nightmare” can be avoided or, in a more dire sense, if we can wake up 
from the “nightmare” we already have begun dreaming, it is going to take a re-
orientation of our perspective to our popular culture. It is going to take a 
renewed affirmation of the “fully clothed” self—the self intricately bound in a 
web of community, history, and tradition. 
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